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The Promise of Pico: A New Definition
of Orthodoxy
James C. O'Brien
Justice Brennan's opinion for the plurality in Board of Education v.
Pico' has confounded commentators. They interpret it as arguing that the
right to receive information and ideas should extend to secondary school
students.2 Interpreted this way, the opinion is an utter failure. It creates a
right that forces public school officials to accede to student demands to
retain any book.' It therefore undercuts community and professional con-
trol of schools. At the same time, the right applies only to the removal of
books from libraries, leaving students unprotected in the classroom and in
the process of selecting books.'
This Note argues that the Pico plurality opinion does not confer the
right to receive ideas upon high school students. Instead, it invites contem-
1. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). Seven justices wrote opinions in Pico. Justices Stevens and Marshall
joined Justice Brennan's opinion. Justice Blackmun joined all but one section. Justice White con-
curred in the result only. See infra note 35 (discussing opinions).
2. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 887 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan's opinion requires
that schools "be the courier" of all ideas); id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (granting students a
right to receive is "wholly unsupported by our past decisions and inconsistent with the necessarily
selective process of elementary and secondary education"); Brown v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Nebraska, 640 F. Supp. 674, 678 (D. Neb. 1986); American Future Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ.,
568 F. Supp. 666, 670 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
Academic commentators have also regarded Justice Brennan's opinion as extending the right to
receive ideas to students. See, e.g., J. BRYSON & E. DETTY, CENSORSHIP OF PUBLIC SCHOOL LI-
BRARY AND INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIAL 80-81 (1982); Bosmajian, The Judiciary's Use of Meta-
phors, Metonymies and Other Tropes to Give First Amendment Protection to Students and Teachers,
15 J. L. & EDUC. 439, 459-60 (1986); Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Ortho-
doxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. F. 15, 53; Lee, The Supreme Court
and the Right to Receive Expression, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 303, 304, 323-26; Mitchell, Secularism in
Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REv. 603, 717 (1987); van Geel, The
Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REv.
197, 231 (1983); Yudof, Library Book Selection and the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archime-
dean Point, 59 IND. L.J. 527, 542 (1984); Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-
State Voices in the Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REv.
497, 507 (1983) [hereinafter Note, State Indoctrination].
3. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 893 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Alny junior high school student...
may invite a judge to overrule an educational decision .. "); id. at 912 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(all authors could require that books be put into school libraries); see also Freeman, The Supreme
Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model
of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 43-50 (1984); Ingber, supra note 2, at 51 n.209 & 54
n.221.
4. Justice Brennan limited his holding to the removal of books from school libraries. 457 U.S. at
862, 868. This limitation follows Pico's facts. The case involved the removal of eleven books from
school libraries and one book from the twelfth-grade curriculum. See also Ingber, supra note 2, at
57-58.
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porary revision of the Court's long-standing principle that school officials
may not "cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom" 5 and allows us to
examine again the limits of schools' power to inculcate community values
into students. This Note contends that public schools should be allowed to
advocate community values, but that they must not be allowed to argue
for those values unfairly. The Note suggests a definition of unfairness. It
draws heavily from studies of the transmission of ideas within schools and
throughout society. These studies establish that students already have ac-
cess to ideas; orthodoxy arises in how schools present the ideas.
Section I surveys the doctrine that protects students against orthodoxy.
It argues that, under that doctrine, orthodoxy exists when students are not
trained to criticize systems of belief. It criticizes the Supreme Court's ap-
plication of that principle. Section II develops a new definition of ortho-
doxy. It notes that students generally have access to ideas that are not
endorsed by school officials. Schools influence how students evaluate those
ideas and prevent students from developing the critical abilities empha-
sized in Supreme Court doctrine. First, schools define aspirational terms,
such as "democracy," solely in terms of beliefs favored by school officials.
Second, schools depict disfavored beliefs as utopian. Effective student pro-
tections against orthodoxy must forbid those argumentative techniques.
Section III discusses how to implement an approach that recognizes this
aspect of orthodoxy. Courts should declare that the First Amendment
guards against orthodoxy in how ideas are discussed. Beyond this conver-
sation-starting function, however, courts' role is limited. School officials,
parents, and community groups must take the lead. They can rely on the
educators who have developed educational programs compatible with the
notion of orthodoxy developed here.'
5. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). The Court first protected students
from orthodoxy in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See infra text accompanying notes 8-25
(describing development of orthodoxy test).
6. This Note might help in other areas of First Amendment law. For example, some scholars have
argued that the First Amendment requires inclusion of dissenting voices in public debate. See J. BAR-
RON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781,
786 (1987). The authorities relied on in this Note contend that public debate may be orthodox even
after all ideas are admitted. See infra notes 78-80. Current discussions of public debate, therefore,
omit a condition necessary for robust public debate.
The Note might also help evaluate claims that public education contravenes the establishment
clause or restricts the free exercise of religion. See, e.g., Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile
County, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987) (establishment clause); Mozert v. Hawkins County, 827 F.2d
1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (free exercise clause). Insofar as courts must determine whether the texts chal-
lenged in those cases present ideas in an orthodox manner, the framework of this Note will prove
useful. Of course, the establishment and free exercise clauses implicate concerns and precedents be-
yond the scope of this Note. This Note therefore will not discuss claims brought under those clauses.
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I. THE DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR EXPANDING THE BAN ON
ORTHODOXY
This Section presents an internal critique of the Supreme Court's or-
thodoxy doctrine. That doctrine is organized around two often conflicting
imperatives, public schools' interest in inculcating community values and
their duty to prepare students for citizenship." The latter duty is defined
by the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. The Section argues that
each time the Court's First Amendment doctrine announces a new prereq-
uisite for self-government, that prerequisite must be incorporated into
public schools.
The Section also criticizes the Court's application of the First Amend-
ment in public schools. The Court often limits schools' power to advocate
community values. This approach overlooks the importance of instilling
those values in students. It also protects students' First Amendment rights
inadequately. The erosion of schools' ability to argue for community val-
ues causes subsequent courts to return too much power to school officials
and thus to impair students' rights. This see-saw approach to schools'
constitutional duties benefits no one.
A. Setting The Stage For Pico: From Meyer to Tinker
The connection between student protections against orthodoxy and First
Amendment doctrine is evident in the origins of them both. Students re-
ceived no protection against orthodoxy until the 1920's.8 Just after World
War I, however, the Court began to acknowledge that individual auton-
omy was sharply implicated by the ability to express ideas.' The Court
7. Public schools officials may "establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as to transmit
community values." Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (quoting Brief for School Board at
10). See Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 570-71 (1988); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). Public schools must also foster "the individual freedom of mind" essential to
effective self-government. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); see also
Note, State Indoctrination, supra note 2, at 532 (Supreme Court requires that public schools prepare
students for personal and societal self-government). See generally Levin, Educating Youth for Citizen-
ship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L. J.
1647 (1986) (review of Supreme Court decisions); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 151-60 (1982) (conflict between freedom and inculcation irreconcilable).
8. See Tyack & Benavot, Courts and Public Schools: Educational Litigation in Historical Per-
spective, 19 LAW & Soc'y REV. 339 (1985) (19th century litigation over schools concerned creation of
school districts and their funding, rarely touched on content of curriculum). Most early schools were
associated with churches and other groups that openly avowed their intentions to inculcate orthodoxy
in students. This fact lends significance to the absence of judicial protection. See Note, Education and
the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 944 (1987) (describ-
ing history of schools).
9. The degree to which individuals could be said to have rights to free speech, and the extent of
those rights they had, became a focus of disagreement in the Supreme Court at about the time the
Court first recognized students' right to be free of state-imposed orthodoxy. See Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918) (conviction of pamphleteers upheld); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616 (1919) (same); id. at 658 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that pamphleteers lacked intention to
implement opinions and should therefore have been said to have been exercising their rights to free
speech).
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first protected students against orthodoxy in the early 1920's."O The pen-
dulum swung back toward school officials once the Court became con-
cerned with national harmony just before the start of World War II,
however."
This early protection was very limited. The Court invalidated public
school policies only when they threatened to create uniformity of belief or
opinion among students. 12 The proscription against orthodoxy, then, of-
fered students the limited right to be free of efforts to produce conformity
of belief or expression. 3 The provenance of the early orthodoxy doctrine
partly explained its narrow scope. In Meyer and Pierce, student protec-
tions against orthodoxy rested in the Fourteenth Amendment.14 This
amendment protected only those "fundamental rights" of individuals cov-
ered by the Court's substantive due process doctrines. 5 Curricular deci-
sions apparently did not implicate those fundamental rights.', Not sur-
prisingly, most plaintiffs relying on Meyer and Pierce lost.'
7
The orthodoxy doctrine's interaction with the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence soon changed that. In 1925, the Court held that the First
Amendment applied to the States.'" By the time Barnette was decided in
10. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Supreme Court struck down state laws that
forbade the teaching of German to young students. Soon after Meyer, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), invalidated state laws which required all students to attend public schools. In West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the Court ruled unconstitutional West
Virginia's requirement that students pledge allegiance to the United States flag. See Ross, A Judicial
Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125, 185-203 (1988) (argu-
ing that Meyer increased Court's willingness to protect individual liberties).
11. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, West Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
12. In Meyer, the Court held that statutes proscribing instruction in German were unconstitu-
tional efforts to "foster a homogeneous people." 262 U.S. at 402. The Court described its holding in
Pierce as a limitation on states' power to "standardize" their citizens. Id. at 535. Finally, Justice
Jackson's opinion in Barnette rested on the premise that the First Amendment forbade school authori-
ties from attempting "compulsory unification of opinion" by requiring students to express beliefs
supported by school authorities. 319 U.S. at 641-42.
13. Meyer, Pierce, and Barnette involved statutes that dictated to all children, stipulating (respec-
tively) what they must or must not study, where they would study, and what beliefs they would
express. The Court implied that less universal inculcation would be constitutional. For example,
Meyer promised only that the United States would not become Sparta or Plato's Republic. 262 U.S. at
401-02. Also, the least accommodation of dissent satisfied the Court. West Virginia's flag salute regu-
lations were initially challenged by the P.T.A., the Girl and Boy Scouts, the Red Cross, and the
Federation Womens' Clubs, in addition to the Jehovah's Witnesses. 319 U.S. at 627-28. Only the
group that was forced to "conform," id. at 629, came before the Court. Justice Jackson noted in
passing that "concessions" were made to these groups but not to the Jehovah's Witnesses. Id. at 628.
He did not describe these concessions. This omission suggested that by making any concessions the
board established that it did not want to impose orthodoxy on those groups. But see Note, State
Indoctrination, supra note 2 (arguing that Meyer, Pierce, and Barnette created expansive student
rights).
14. Meyer derives the protection from students' substantive due process rights. See Meyer, 262
U.S. at 401; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35.
15. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.
16. Meyer did not curtail states' power to "prescribe a curriculum." Id. at 402.
17. See Note, State Indoctrination, supra note 2, at 527 n.106 (surveying cases brought under
Meyer and Pierce).
18. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). Gitlow was announced one week after Pierce.
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1943, the Court had recast the ban on orthodoxy as a First Amendment
right.19 The First Amendment brought new considerations to bear on ju-
dicial review of school officials' decisions. The primary one was the re-
quirement that schools prepare students for self-government. Justice Jack-
son, writing for the Court, stressed that public schools were "educating
the youth for citizenship."'2 The students would practice this "citizen-
ship" in a country that prized diversity and dissent.21 The very structure
of the government that these citizens would control preserved diversity.2"
Hence, public schools had to embody intellectual openness, lest they
"teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes." 2 The Barnette Court deduced the proscription of orthodoxy
from the First Amendment's role in the structure of American govern-
ment.2 After Barnette, then, the orthodoxy doctrine no longer supported
limiting student protections to their fundamental rights.
Over the next twenty-five years, the doctrinal basis for limiting stu-
dents' protection against orthodoxy to conformity eroded further. The
Court strengthened the free speech rights of public school teachers. 5 Over
the same period, the Court's First Amendment decisions placed increasing
emphasis on the right to receive information and ideas." These changes in
doctrine broadened the idea of self-government to which schools were re-
sponsible. It now included a measure of individual freedom of inquiry and
19. See, e.g., Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled, West Va. State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Ross argues that the shift in doctrinal basis
merely acknowledged that Meyer and Pierce prepared the Court to extend the First Amendment to the
states. See Ross, supra note 10.
20. 319 U.S. at 637.
21. According to Justice Jackson, America thrives on "the right to differ as to things that touch
the heart of the existing order." Id. at 642.
22. Id. at 638 ("The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy .
23. Id. at 637.
24. Barnette sits in a line of cases in which the Supreme Court tacitly endorsed the deduction-
from-structure approach. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-50 (1936); United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff d, 326 U.S. 1 (1944); Pen-
nenkamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 354-55 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Terminello v. Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The structural approach grew into a full-fledged theory in the work of
Alexander Meiklejohn at about that time. Meiklejohn argued that free speech furthers self-
government by citizens. Governmental action must be evaluated by whether it helps or hinders speech
in playing that role. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948); see also Note, State Indoctrination, supra note 2, at 518-21 (proposing that self-government
rationale control judicial review of school officials' decisions).
25. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
These developments gained momentum in the late 1960's. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) (rights of secondary school teacher); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (college instructor). See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 1045 (1968). A respected lower court opinion typified developments at that time. See James
v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972) (secondary school
teacher).
26. The Court recognized the right to receive ideas the same sitting it decided Barnette. See Mar-
tin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). It further developed the right in Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965). A majority of the Court first embraced the right in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969).
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expression, of freedom from centralized control. This freedom could not be
unlimited, however, for public schools still had to inculcate community
values.
Hence, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict27 only partly reflected the developments in the orthodoxy doctrine.
The Court invalidated the suspension of students who expressed political
views at odds with views favored by school authorities. The Court de-
scribed the suspensions as impermissible attempts to make students into
"closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to
communicate."2
The Court's assertion was implausible. The school limited only one
form of expression. It did not deny students access to ideas outside the
school. There was no realistic danger of a "closed-circuit" that would pro-
duce conformity of belief in students. In contrast, the programs invalidated
in the earlier cases were much more far-reaching. Meyer, Pierce, and Bar-
nette struck down state-wide laws dictating what students would study,
where they would study, and what political beliefs thay would express.2 '9
In Tinker, then, the Court in fact diverged from its traditional definition
of orthodoxy.
The actual violation in Tinker became apparent only when seen
through the lens of the structural insight that motivated Barnette. The
opinion quoted Keyishian v. Board of Regents, emphasizing that individ-
ual freedom to inquire insured "wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas" upon which the "Nation's future depends."130 The suspensions
punished some students for inquiring and no doubt inhibited the inquiry
of others. They therefore impaired the students' training for self-
government. Nevertheless, the Court's reference to a "closed-circuit"
hewed to the definition of orthodoxy as conformity.
The Tinker Court's reluctance to abandon the conformity definition
stemmed in part from concern for public schools' inculcative function. Un-
less schools could praise some ideas and condemn others, they could not
advocate community values. A reasonable accomodation of both inculca-
tion and preparation for self-government was to cast the school as having
gone too far, without saying that what the school did was wrong in itself.
This was what the Court did by resorting to the flimsy fiction that the
suspensions posed a risk of conformity.
31
27. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
28. Id. at 511. The Court stressed that student protests against the Vietnam War had been "sin-
gled out for prohibition" by the school administration. Id. at 510-11. The administration allowed
students to express viewpoints on other controversial issues. Id. The Court held that students had a
right to express opinions, so long as their expression "did not materially disrupt" normal educational
activities. Id. at 509.
29. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 290 U.S. 510 (1925);
West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See supra notes 10, 13.
30. See 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
31. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Leading Cases, 83 HAMV. L. REv. 154, 160
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Buried in the opinion was a major innovation, however. Justice Fortas
noted that school officials would violate students' First Amendment rights
by creating a "safe-haven for crackpots" outside the usual flow of ideas. 2
This standard is novel within the orthodoxy tradition. By allowing the
ideas into the school, even into a "safe-haven," school officials would sat-
isfy the orthodoxy test. Because the school would also not use its discipli-
nary power to punish the expression of disfavored ideas, school officials
would escape Tinker's test. Instead, the "safe-haven" would signal that
ideas placed there ought not be taken seriously. The school would have
unfairly affected how students evaluate ideas after the ideas were admitted
to the school. This aspect of the Tinker opinion heralded for the first time
judicial willingness to examine how public schools affected the evaluation
of ideas, rather than merely how schools controlled student access to ideas.
The Court did not develop this insight. On the surface of the opinions
in the Meyer-Tinker line of cases, then, the Court's concern with ortho-
doxy was implicated only when the justices were persuaded that school
officials had tried to achieve uniformity of opinion. Bubbling under the
surface, however, was a much broader right. The justices had established
that self-government presupposed individual freedom to inquire, to receive
ideas, and, perhaps, to be free of undue influence in evaluating those
ideas.
B. The Promise of Pico
The definition of orthodoxy as conformity remained unchallenged until
Pico, in 1982.11 Pico arose when the Island Trees School Board removed
eleven books from school libraries and one book from its curriculum. Stu-
dents sued.34 The Supreme Court held that the students had stated a
claim upon which relief could be granted. It splintered, writing seven
opinions. 3
(1969).
32. 393 U.S. at 513.
33. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
34. The district court granted summary judgment for the school board on the ground that the
student plaintiffs had not stated a claim on which relief could be granted. 474 F. Supp. 387
(E.D.N.Y. 1979). A divided panel of the Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial. 638
F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980). Before the case went to trial, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 454
U.S. 891 (1981). After the Supreme Court's decision, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), the school board returned
the books. The case never went to trial.
35. Justices Stevens, Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and White affirmed the Second Circuit. Jus-
tices Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Burger dissented. There were three opinions
from the justices in the majority, four by the dissenters. Justices Stevens and Marshall joined a plural-
ity opinion written by Justice Brennan. This opinion held that public school officials could not remove
books "simply because they dislike the ideas in them." 457 U.S. at 872. Justice Blackmun said that
school boards could remove books for "politically neutral" reasons. Id. at 880 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring). He joined the plurality for its standard. Justice White argued that further findings of fact were
necessary. He contended that it was inappropriate to address the constitutional issue. Id. at "883
(White, J., concurring). The dissenting justices favored the traditional interpretation of the orthodoxy
test. See, e.g., id. at 889 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (all dissenting justices joining).
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Justice Brennan's opinion for the plurality makes a subtle but signifi-
cant break from the Meyer-Tinker tradition. The opinion concluded that
the evidence did not foreclose the possibility that the School Board had
attempted "to impose upon the students. . .a political orthodoxy to which
[the members of the Board] and their constituents adhered."' 6 A majority
of the Court supported this conclusion."7 The opinion drew on the Meyer-
Tinker line of cases.3" Yet it applied those cases when there was no risk of
conformity. Students had access to ideas outside the library; they might
have been taught them in the classroom. Unlike the opinion in Tinker, the
Pico plurality did not even assert that the school officials sought conform-
ity. The orthodoxy found in the Pico plurality opinion, then, lacked the
central defining feature of the orthodoxies struck down in the cases on
which the opinion relied. This shift was correct. After Tinker, the Court's
First Amendment cases had changed the prerequisites for self-government.
This required the Court to alter the duty of public schools to prepare
students for self-government. Justice Brennan cast a spotlight on this
evolution. He placed the right to receive ideas and the academic freedom
cases, important in Tinker, into the structural model prominent in Bar-
nette. The opinion's premise was that public schools must prepare stu-
dents for self-government. 9 This recalled Barnette's emphasis on prepar-
ing students for "citizenship. °40 The opinion then discussed what the
Court required schools to do in order to prepare students for citizenship.
One requirement emerged from the right to receive ideas doctrine, which
had grown in significance since Tinker."' During this time, courts strug-
36. Id. at 875.
37. Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun all joined this part of the opinion. Justice White's
agreement must be inferred from his concurrence. The plaintiffs argued that the attempted imposition
of orthodoxy was a claim upon which relief could be granted. The case presented the Court with only
the limited question of whether it was. Justice White's vote to remand for trial implied that he ac-
cepted the viability of the claim.
38. The opinion illustrated students' First Amendment rights by describing Barnette and Tinker.
457 U.S. at 865-66. In articulating the First Amendment's restrictions on removal of books from
school libraries, Justice Brennan wrote that he relied on "the guidance of several precedents," most
notably Barnette's conclusion that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion," id. at 869-70 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S.
at 642), and Keyishian's principle that "the First Amendment . . .does not tolerate laws that cast a
pall of orthodoxy over the classroom," id. at 870 (citing Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
39. 457 U.S. at 866. The structural perspective gained importance after Barnette was decided in
1943. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Justice Brennan au-
thored these opinions, as well as an influential concurrence in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
U.S. 301 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191 (1965).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
41. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the "right of viewers and
listeners. . . is paramount"); Kleindeist v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763 (1972) (right to receive infor-
mation and ideas "vital" in schools and universities); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
(right to receive uncensored letters from prisoners); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1978) (right to receive commercial information).
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gled with its effect on students' protection from orthodoxy.42 Justice Bren-
nan correctly declared that this doctrine established that access to ideas
nurtured the analytical abilities crucial to citizenship. 4 Another precondi-
tion for self-government arose from the academic freedom cases. This doc-
trine had applied primarily to post-secondary school teachers.4" By the
1980's, courts had extended that freedom to secondary and primary school
teachers.4" Justice Brennan declared that individuals' ability to seek out
ideas on their own enhanced the evaluation of ideas essential to self-
government. 46 The two doctrines together defined what was necessary to
prepare students for participation as citizens: a range of ideas and the
ability to select from them voluntarily. This required discarding the tradi-
tional definition of orthodoxy as conformity.
Commentators interpreted this opinion as granting students a right to
receive ideas.47 The right to receive played a subordinate role throughout
the opinion. The opinion defined students' First Amendment freedoms by
describing the facts of Tinker and Barnette.4 s Only then did it introduce
the right to receive ideas. 49 The holding of the opinion focused on stu-
dents' protection against orthodoxy.5 The right to receive ideas might al-
low students to demand access to any and every idea. The orthodoxy test
grants them a right only to ideas that dispel orthodoxy. The definition of
orthodoxy will determine what information they will receive.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Pico wove together the doctrinal threads
that had influenced the orthodoxy doctrine. In doing so, it eviscerated the
constricted definition of orthodoxy as conformity and laid out the minimal
requirements any new definition would have to meet. That definition
must prepare students for self-government by enabling individual inquiry
and by allowing students to evaluate ideas without interference from
42. Compare Right to Read Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714
(D. Mass. 1978) (students must "be exposed to controversial thoughts and ideas") and Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) (same) with Zykan v. Warsaw Commu-
nity School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980) (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that
school authorities attempted "rigid and exclusive indoctrination") and Island Trees Union Free
School Dist. v. Pico, 638 F.2d 404, 417 (2d Cir. 1980) (Sifton, J.) (requiring showing that school
board tried to impose "orthodoxy for all purposes in the particular community") and Presidents
Council v. City School Bd., 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (school boards
may shape educational policy to conform to values of members). An interesting compromise was at-
tempted in Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 775-79 (8th Cir. 1982) (al-
lowing removal of books for ideological reasons but also requiring nonideological justification).
43. 457 U.S. at 868.
44. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (college instructor).
45. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (review-
ing cases); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972) (secondary school teacher).
46. 457 U.S. at 869 (quoting Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,
715 (D. Mass. 1978)).
47. See supra note 2.
48. 457 U.S. at 865-66.
49. Id. at 866-68.
50. Id. at 875.
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school officials. Only then can students learn to criticize, a skill essential
to self-government.
0. The Problem of Pico: Defining Orthodoxy
Unfortunately, Justice Brennan's opinion did not fulfill its promise. Al-
though the opinion held that the evidence did not foreclose the possibility
that the Island Trees School Board attempted to impose orthodoxy,51 it
did not define the "orthodoxy" it found in the Island Tree Schools. In-
stead, it declared that school officials could not remove books "simply be-
cause they dislike the ideas in them." 5 For example, school board mem-
bers belonging to the Democratic Party, "motivated by party affiliation,"
could not remove all books favoring the Republican Party.53 The opinion
required that school officials follow regular procedures when deciding
whether to remove books from libraries.5" This requirement increased the
likelihood that legitimate reasons would predominate in deliberations. 55
The sin of the Island Trees School Board was that it did not follow its
own procedures for evaluating books.
56
The plurality opinion could not protect students adequately. Schools
might design procedures that did not curtail school officials' discretion.
The opinion also did not hold that mere violation of designated procedures
violated the First Amendment. 8 Plaintiffs able to prove procedural irreg-
ularities might therefore be required to establish the existence of illegiti-
mate motivations in order to state a claim under Pico. The opinion dis-
cussed only readily identifiable prejudices, such as membership in a
political party.59 It did not discuss whether less overt biases would violate
the First Amendment. Even a readily identifiable bias would not invali-
date school officials' decisions if there were a legitimate basis for the re-
moval of the book." It did not address how courts could identify motiva-
tions that were not obvious. Officials might mask prejudices behind
legitimate administrative or educational rationales., Members might re-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 872.
53. Id. at 870-71. Also, an "all-white school board, motivated by racial animus" could not "re-
move all books authored by blacks or advocating racial equality and integration." Id. at 871.
54. Id. at 874-75.
55. See Comment, Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico,
12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 578-79 (1984).
56. 457 U.S. at 858, 874. The School Board appointed a committee to review the books. The
Board agreed to adopt the committee's recommendation. In fact, however, it did not.
57. For example, procedures might allow removal solely upon the complaint of a school board
member or citizen. They might delay discussion in order to quiet controversy. Procedures might also
not prevent clandestine removal. See Ingber, supra note 2, at 62.
58. 457 U.S. at 874-75.
59. Id. at 870-71.
60. Id. at 871, 875.
61. See van Geel, supra note 2, at 208 n.41; Case Comment, Education or Indoctrina-
tion-Removal of Book from Public School Libraries, 68 MINN. L. REV. 213, 246 n.188 (1984).
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fuse to articulate any rationale, leaving courts to rely on the crafted opin-
ions of a few school board members. 2 Courts might refuse to investigate
the reasons for a school board's decision. 3 Finally, even if the plaintiffs
could prove the influence of illegitimate motivations, the opinion did not
say who carried the burden of establishing that those motivations were
important in the school board's decision."
The greatest problem with the opinion was that it ran off the track of
its own argument. The insight driving the opinion was that the definition
of orthodoxy as conformity had become obsolete under First Amendment
doctrine. The opinion should have announced a definition of orthodoxy to
replace the discarded conformity interpretation. This definition would
have provided a substantive baseline for the content of school curricula
and libraries. Under the procedural test it announced, however, orthodoxy
imposed through regular channels would not violate the First
Amendment.
The limitations of Justice Brennan's opinion are understandable. It
took a first step into uncharted territory. It decided a motion for summary
judgment and thus was announced without the record that would have
helped in articulating a more detailed standard. 65 His adherence to prece-
dent also limited the reach of his opinion. 6 At the same time, the con-
62. Several members of the Island Trees School Board refused to articulate their reasons. See S.
ABRAMS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING (1983).
63. In Pico a conservative parents' organization spearheaded the drive to remove the books. The
plurality inferred illegitimate motivations from that fact. 457 U.S. at 874. Compare Epperson v. Ar-
kansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1967) (finding unconstitutional legislative intent to establish religion by examin-
ing motives of those who lobbied legislature) and Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F. Supp. 1138, 1147
(N.D. Miss. 1980) (rejecting proffered rationales for textbook selection) with Solmitz v. Maine Ad-
min. School Dist., 495 A.2d 812, 818 (Me. 1985) (court should not impute to school board "invidi-
ous" motivation of parents who influenced decision to cancel play).
64. Justice Brennan recommended that the Mt. Healthy rule fill this gap. 457 U.S. at 871 n. 22
(citing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)). Plaintiffs must
establish the influence of illegitimate motivations in a decisionmaking process. Upon this showing, the
burden lies with the defendants to establish that their decision would have been the same if the
illegitimate motivations had not influenced the decision. See Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
The Mt. Healthy rule would help plaintiffs only minimally. Courts have traditionally deferred to
school officials' judgments about the educational suitability of materials. They might therefore be too
willing to accept school officials' assertions that educational concerns alone justified their decision. See
supra notes 7 & 61.
65. For this reason, Justice White's refusal to decide the constitutional issue was insightful. 457
U.S. at 883 (White, J., concurring).
66. The limits of the pluralty opinion stemmed directly from Justice Brennan's use of precedents.
He explicitly limited his opinion to the removal of books from school libraries. Id. at 868. Many
school cases involved libraries. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (protecting protest
in libraries); Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982); Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (no majority opinion); Minarcini v.
Strongsville School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp.
1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D.Mass.
1978). But see 457 U.S. at 914-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (precedents do not support distinctive
role of libraries). Other precedents developed procedural solutions. See Loewen v. Turnipseed, 488 F.
Supp. 1138 (N.D. Miss. 1980); Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bend-
ing" History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 497, 520-21 (1987) (describing proce-
dural solutions in academic freedom cases).
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straining precedents he relied upon linked Pico to a tradition that evolved
within the First Amendment. The very choice that helped limit the opin-
ion thus also gave it the materials on which it could grow.
6 7
D. Beyond Pico
The opinion has lain fallow, however. Disputes over public schooling
have focused on the substantive information students should or should not
hear." Increasing numbers of topics and groups squeeze into an already
crowded school day, leaving students little time to absorb the information
thrust upon them. 9 These disputes often bring with them the requirement
that teaching be value neutral, that public schools are forbidden to argue
for community values for fear of suppressing other viewpoints.70 Value
neutrality will likely lead to another swing of the pendulum, as courts will
react to fears that communities are disintegrating. Suggestions by academ-
ics add to this problem, producing only amorphous guidelines outlining
more of what schools may or may not teach; these suggestions are of little
67. This attachment to precedent makes Justice Brennan's opinion more fertile than Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion. Justice Blackmun advised the Court to hold "that school officials may
not remove books for the purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives
discussed in them, when that action is motivated simply by the officials' disapproval of the ideas
involved." 457 U.S. at 879-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan linked motivation to ob-
jective prejudice. See supra text accompanying notes 53, 59-63. Justice Blackmun's approach, how-
ever, is wholly subjective. It is therefore more susceptible to the difficulties outlined above. See Note,
Judicial Clairvoyance and the First Amendment: The Role of Motivation in Judicial Review of Book
Banning in the Public Schools, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 731, 737-39 (contrasting motivation test suggested
by Justice Brennan to that advocated by Justice Blackmun).
Some commentators have preferred Justice Blackmun's opinion to Justice Brennan's. See, e.g.,
Ingber, supra note 2, at 60-61; Lee, supra note 2, at 326; Note, State Indoctrination, supra note 2,
at 533. Justice Blackmun certainly stated the underlying issue in the case more straightforwardly than
did Justice Brennan: When does inculcation of values become imposition of orthodoxy? 457 U.S. at
879 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He demurred from Justice Brennan's analysis of the influence the
right to receive ideas had on the protection of students against orthodoxy. He therefore had no doctri-
nal basis for applying the Meyer-Tinker cases when there was no conformity.
Justice Blackmun's deviation from precedent has implications other than accusations of judicial
activism. By tying the orthodoxy doctrine to other First Amendment doctrines, Justice Brennan identi-
fied a pattern of development for the new right. Justice Blackmun severed the link between the ortho-
doxy doctrine and other First Amendment rights. Ironically, then, by freeing his own opinion from
the constraints of precedent, Justice Blackmun deprived the right he sought to develop of the tradition
that could nurture its growth.
68. See Sewall, American History Textbooks: An Assessment of Quality 68-69 (1987) (Report for
Educational Excellence Network) (available from Teachers College, Columbia University) (groups
"slighted" in history books pressure for inclusion in history texts); Tyack & Benavot, supra note 8, at
375 (describing increasing use of litigation by minority groups); Glenn, Textbook Controversies-A
"Disaster"for Public Schools?, PHi DELTA KAPPAN 451, 451 (1987) (general), 454 (gender). Pres-
sures to include even more will soon increase. See, e.g., "Pressures"for Creationism To Be Revisited,
Educ. Week, Feb. 10, 1988, at 28, col. 1; Glenn, supra, at 451 (predicting "flood" of litigation over
content of public schooling). Scholars reflect this focus on 'content. See, e.g., Gottlieb, supra note 66
(advocating "Fairness Doctrine" in public schools).
69. See Sewall, supra note 68.
70. See Sewall, supra note 68 (value neutrality undermines educational effectiveness of textbooks).
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use to school officials and courts. 1 Finally, giving students access to ideas
does not alone protect them against orthodoxy. 2
More troubling, the Supreme Court itself has shown signs of retreating
to its traditional definition of orthodoxy as conformity. This exemplifies
the see-saw tendencies that have been with the orthodoxy doctrine from its
origins. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court allowed a
high school principal to remove several pages from a student newspaper. 3
KuhImeier will influence the orthodoxy doctrine.1 The extent and nature
of this influence is not yet settled, however. Courts and commentators
should work to limit it. The opinion ignores the relevant precedents, the
orthodoxy cases . 5  It creates an unprecedented category of "state-
71. Gottlieb advocated a fairness doctrine for public schools: When important issues over which
there was controversy in the community were discussed in schools, schools had to present both sides.
Gottlieb, supra note 66, at 561-73. Important issues were those "important to constitutional values,"
id. at 570, especially those about participation in government. Id. at 572-73. He did not identify those
issues. Gottlieb's standard would be satisfied if curricula were made to include the views of dissenting
groups. Id. at 572-3. He did not address how those ideas should be discussed. The manner of presen-
tation is the focus of this Note. See also Gordon, Freedom of Expression and Values Inculcation in
Public School Curriculum, 13 J.L. & EDuc. 523 (1984) (arguing that states can inculcate only those
values found in state constitutions; admitting that this standard does not specify how courts can deter-
mine whether only constitutional values are included in curriculum); Note, State Indoctrination,
supra note 2, at 520 (requirement that schools provide information that tends to prepare students for
self-government would "rarely provide a judge with clear-cut practical guidance in actual cases");
Orleans, What Johnny Can't Read: 'First Amendment Rights' in the Classroom, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 1,
14 (1981) (use of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments instead of First Amendment to prevent
inculcation of racism is difficult to apply because "consensus as to what in text is racist" hard to
achieve). Kamenshine proposed a prohibtion on "political establishments." Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979). He did not
discuss how courts would recognize when school officials are attempting "political establishment." See
id. at 1132-38 (discussing implementation of standard in schools).
72. See infra text accompanying notes 78-92.
73. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988). The principal feared that the articles invaded the privacy of several
students and parents. The Court held that public school officials could restrict state-sponsored student
speech so long as the restriction was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at
571.
74. Changes in First Amendment doctrine have always influenced student protections against or-
thodoxy. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 18-26. The influence may be particularly direct here.
The Court required that restrictions on student expression be merely "reasonable." 108 S. Ct. at 571.
This might permit punishment or prohibition of student speech that "frustrates the school's legitimate
pedagogical purposes merely by expressing a message that conflicts with the school's." Id. at 574
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. ("A student who responds to a political science teacher's ques-
tion with the retort, 'Socialism is good,' subverts the school's inculcation of the message that capitalism
is better.").
Kuhlmeier has already eroded students' First Amendment protections. See Virgil v. School Bd. of
Columbia County, 677 F. Supp. 1547 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (upholding removal of text containing Lysis-
trata and Chaucer's The Miller's Tale); see also Hazelwood Hits Home at Darien High School, 14
Conn. Law Trib. 4 (May 16, 1988); "Ripple Effect" of High Court's Press Ruling Seen as Test of
Schools'Journalism Policies, Educ. Week, Feb. 10, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
75. The Court held that the paper was "developed within the adopted curriculum," 108 S. Ct. at
568-69 (quoting Hazelwood Curriculum Guide), and was part of "regular classroom activities." Id.;
see also id. at 570. Decisions about curricula should be reviewed under the relevant precedents;
Meyer, Pierce, Barnette, Tinker, and Pico. See id. at 574 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Note,
High School Newspapers and the Public Forum Doctrine: Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 74
VA. L. REv. 843, 859-61 (1988) (Supreme Court should have applied Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969)). Kuhtmeier did not discuss the orthodoxy analysis in Meyer, Pierce,
Barnette, or Pico. It distinguished student speech like that in Tinker from "student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities," 108 S. Ct. at 570-71, such as "a school-sponsored publication, theat-
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sponsored student expression" from whole cloth. 6 Finally, this broad new
category obscures the opinion's relatively minor modification of Tinker.
Tinker protected students from disturbances in public schools; Kuhimeier
extends that same protection to parents." Its influence can best be dimin-
ished if courts have an alternative. To do this, the opportunity apparent in
the Pico plurality opinion must be seized.
II. A NEW DEFINITION OF ORTHODOXY
This Section defines orthodoxy in terms of how ideas are taught. It
draws on studies of secondary school textbooks in American history and
studies of how ideas are transmitted. These studies emphasize that stu-
dents need not fear conformity. 8 They demonstrate that schools reinforce
rical production, or other vehicle of student expression." Id. at 571. See infra note 76 (criticizing new
category).
76. Tinker did not distinguish between state-sponsored speech and student speech that fortuitously
occurred on school grounds. Tinker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See 108 S. Ct. at 575 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Bethel School District v. Fraser concerned a student speech nominating a fellow student for
state-sponsored student government and given at a school-sponsored assembly. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Yet Fraser applied Tinker's standard in upholding punishment of the student for making a disruptive
speech; see also Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 575 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Kuhlmeier also ignored the doctrinal significance of incorporating First Amendment rights. Meyer
and Pierce evaluated school policies under the reasonable relation test of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). Barnette held that the First Amendment required
a more stringent test. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
Kuhlmeier reinstated the reasonableness test. 108 S. Ct. at 571.
The new category of "school-sponsored student speech" may limit Kuhlmeier's reach. See Burch v.
Barker, 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (refusing to apply Kuhlmeier to underground newspaper).
Student speech that is not school-sponsored should still be subject to Tinker's standard. Id. See
Abrams & Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline of Student Press Rights in the Wake of Hazel-
wood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706 (Kuhlmeier will not reach independent
student publications).
77. Tinker expressly allowed school officials to limit student speech that might "impinge upon the
rights of other students." See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. The principal argued that the excised articles
would violate the rights of other students and their parents. Kuhlmeier therefore merely extended
Tinker to include parents, as well as students. Decisions about curricula might not implicate others'
rights as did newspaper articles about divorce and teenage pregnancy. (In cases under the free exercise
clause, plaintiffs have alleged that mere exposure to ideas infringed their free exercise of religion. See,
e.g., Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985). These cases are outside the
scope of this Note.)
78. A recent review of empirical research into what students know concluded:
[Sichools are social sites characterized by overt and hidden curricula, tracking, dominant and
subordinate cultures, and competing class ideologies. Of course, conflict and resistance take
place within asymmetrical relations of power which always favor the dominant classes, but the
essential point is that there are complex and creative fields of resistance through which class-
race- and gender-mediated practices often refuse, reject, and dismiss the central messages of the
schools.
Giroux, Theories of Reproduction and Resistance in the New Sociology of Education: A Critical
Analysis, 53 HARV. EDUC. REV. 257, 260 (1983); see also CRrICAL PEDAGOGY & CULTURAL
POWER (D. Livingstone ed. 1987). The diversity of viewpoints in public schools may well grow, as
more and more groups petition school authorities to include their viewpoints or experiences in educa-
tional materials. See supra note 68. Of course, not all students have access to information that coun-
ters every idea articulated by school officials. Nevertheless, diversity of information allows students to
select what they think is important from a range of alternatives and provides students with materials
with which they can reject value judgments advocated by school officials. See infra note 79 (describing
"resistance" theory).
Sociologists have concentrated on this diversity of viewpoints in public schools only recently. Re-
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ideas favored by school officials even while giving students access to disfa-
vored ideas.79 The Note proposes a definition of orthodoxy that takes that
searchers had assumed there was one ideology taught in public schools and had devoted themselves to
excavating the one ideology taught by schools. See, e.g., S. BOWLES & H. GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN
CAPITALIST AMERICA (1976) (public schools assimilate working class to capitalism); Arons & Law-
rence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309 (1980) (assuming that societies coalesce around one dominant ideology). In
the mid-1970's, however, sociologists began to focus on the diversity of views and cultures expressed
by students and teachers, rather than to look for a single underlying ideology in schools. Two classic
studies were P. BOURDIEU & J.-C. PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CUL-
TURE 197-210 (1977) (French education system), and P. WILUS, LEARNING TO LABOUR: How
WORKING CLASS KIDS GET WORKING CLASS JOBS (1977) (English elementary schools). The conse-
quences of the shift in method are described in Giroux, supra, at 258-59, 282-83 (critiquing ex-
panded scope of recent educational research); Apple & Weis, Introduction, in IDEOLOGY AND PRAC-
TICE IN SCHOOLING 12-16 (M. Apple & L. Weis eds. 1983) (same).
79. This conclusion arose from the theory of "resistance." Researchers found that people who did
not benefit from distributions of power and resources often had beliefs and values directly opposing
those of more powerful groups; often, the same words and gestures took on diametrically opposed
meanings in different social classes. See, e.g., L. LABOV, SOCIOLINGISTIC PATTERNS (1972). Further
research along these lines uncovered an overwhelming diversity of viewpoints within each society, and,
more importantly, a strong tendency among members of the lower classes to reject any claim to privi-
lege made on behalf of powerful classes. In short, resistance theory researchers found that there was
no single ideology controlling most citizens' reaction to the structure of their society. See N. ABER-
CROMBIE, S. HILL & B. TURNER, THE DOMINANT IDEOLOGY THESIS (1980).
Researchers next asked, if there were many diverse and opposing beliefs in a society, what kept the
society together? They proposed three answers. The first explanation simply noted that oppositional
groups are powerless to unseat dominant groups. This impotence worsened when members of the
oppositional groups, recognizing their inability to reshape society, refused to participate in activities
that might promote change beneficial to them. See, e.g., P. WILLIS, supra note 78 (examining process
by which working class students adopt nonoppositional stances).
Other scholars advanced explanations that concentrated on discourse. They argued that members of
oppositional groups could not articulate programs for social change because they (and their intended
audience) used "restricted codes," in contrast to the "elaborated codes" of the upper classes. See 1 B.
BERNSTEIN, CLASS, CODES, AND CONTROL (1971). This answer overlooked the sophistication of
"lower class" codes. See, e.g., L. LABOV, supra (arguing that "Black English" fulfilled all purposes of
"White English"); Fowler, Power, in 4 HANDBOOK OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
IN SOCIETY (T. van Dijk ed. 1985) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (surveying developments since Bern-
stein's studies).
Out of the rudimentary distinction between "restricted" and "elaborate" codes grew a third, more
sophisticated approach. Pierre Bourdieu, for example, argued that communities were built on struc-
tures of beliefs and meanings. As in any structure, some beams could be altered or even removed
without endangering or changing the structure, while others could not be touched at all. Disagreement
with the latter "beams" was difficult if not impossible within the community's language; the "re-
stricted code" was intrinsic to membership in the community, and was not limited to the lower classes,
as Bernstein suggested.
But matters were even more complex than this. There were structures within the areas of disagree-
ment, Bourdieu contended. An idea's position within that structure predisposed a member of the com-
munity to favor or disfavor it. These predispositions were akin to presumptions and, as such, could be
overcome by almost all members of the community in some circumstances and by some individual
members at any time. Such variations notwithstanding, a researcher could identify the norms of a
group by excavating the structure which shaped its beliefs. See P. BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A So-
CIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (R. Nice trans. 1984) (examining aesthetic and con-
sumer preferences).
John Thompson surveyed Bourdieu's work and similar efforts. He concluded that societies did not
coalesce around a set of beliefs that was internally consistent but instead around the ability to use a
vocabulary in ways that mask disagreements. J. THOMPSON, STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF IDEOLOGY
5 (1984). The danger, as Fowler and Thompson noted, was that some interpretations within that
vocabulary were "associated with situations of prestige, success, and authority, and some with situa-
tions of powerlessness and deprivation." See Fowler, supra, at 62.
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reality into account.8"
Jean Anyon studied high school textbooks on United States history, es-
pecially their coverage of populist programs for political and economic
reform.8 Anyon found that radical unions, their leaders, and their policies
were ignored, insulted, or dismissed as dishonest;82 that the possibility of
government regulation being co-opted by business was never mentioned;8"
that the books discussed only strikes that ended in violence and ultimately
It is important to emphasize that these scholars did not paint a conspiratorial picture of public
discourse. In their view, it was not necessary to believe that elites controlled public discourse. They
argued that flaws in public discourse emanated from the structure of the community itself. See, e.g., P.
BOURDIEU, supra. Hence, it was not surprising that the barriers to full discussion of alternative ideas
appeared in the writings of those who favored change. See, e.g., Fowler, supra, at 76; see also infra
note 90 (discussing studies by Fowler and others).
80. The researchers relied on here examined how the surface features of public discourse reflected
ideas' role in maintaining power relationships between men and women, between races, and between
social and economic classes. This tradition can be labelled "political discourse analysis." The original
discourse analysts focused on micro-interactions, such as those between two people, among small
groups, or in the classroom. They examined how social structure was embedded in the minutiae of
daily life, for example, in how men or women took turns while conversing, or in men's dominance of
conversational topics. They also studied the ways that meanings were negotiated within groups, and
revealed mechanisms by which some meanings rose to prominence while others were marginalized.
During the 1970's, European social theorists expanded the scale of discourse analysis to see, for
example, who speaks in society, what turn-taking was allowed, how shared symbols had different
meanings in different social groups, and how these differences reflected power imbalances. They ar-
gued that language was "constitutive" of social reality. In saying language constructed social reality,
they did not advance the naive claim that language conferred power on people or institutions that
would otherwise have lacked it. Rather, they argued that language created a set of relationships
among people, and between people and the institutions of their society, in which existing distributions
of power seemed natural. The important corollary of this thesis was that it became difficult (literally
"unnatural") to articulate ideas or grievances that challenged these distributions. See M. HALLIDAY,
LANGUAGE As SOCIAL SEMIOTIC (1978). Political discourse analysts contended that silences in public
discourse protected institutions that benefited those with power. See, e.g., R. FOWLER, R. HODGE, G.
KRESS & T. TREW, LANGUAGE AND CONTROL 35-36 (1979); see also F. BURTON & P. CARLEN,
OFFICIAL DISCOURSE (1979); P. GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE 125-39 (1987).
The political discourse analysts' perspective on the role language played in maintaining power did
not originate the politically sensitive analysis of public discourse. Relevant, exemplary studies include
T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1936); K. BURKE, A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES (1950);
and Veblen, The Captains of Industry, in THE PORTABLE VEBLEN (1976) (analyzing the rhetoric of
entrepreneurship). In the overtness of their political turn, however, the political discourse analysts
were unique. Teel van Dijk, for example, hoped that studies establishing that mass media reinforced
existing power distributions would change journalistic practice. See van Dijk, Introduction, in HAND-
BOOK, supra note 79, at 8. Fowler called upon sociolinguists to infuse a "social purpose" into their
investigations. See Fowler, supra note 79, at 62.
The basic insight should not be new to legal scholars. Joseph Vining argued that standing doctrines
operated by making it difficulty to describe certain conditions as deserving of legal remedy. See J.
VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY (1978). The thesis that language created and reinforced relationships that
were self-perpetuating was central to the law and rhetoric movement. See J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS
LOSE THEIR MEANINGS (1984). The political turn of the discourse analysts' work had the transform-
ative aspirations typical of work in the Critical Legal Studies movement.
81. Anyon, Workers, Labor and Economic History, and Textbook Content, in IDEOLOGY AND
PRACTICE IN SCHOOLING, supra note 78, at 37. Anyon examined 17 textbooks approved for use in
two large Northeastern cities. See also Anyon, Ideology and U.S. History Textbooks, 49 HARV. EDUC.
REV. 361 .(1979). Anyon's results have been replicated in Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism, supra
note 66 (conducting independent review of high school American history texts, as well as reviewing
other studies).
82. Anyon, Workers, Labor and Economic History, and Textbook Content, supra note 81, at
42-46.
83. Id. at 41-42.
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did not get workers what they wanted;8 4 and that reformist leaders and
moderate reform legislation were lauded.85 Anyon noted that each position
taken in the texts was controversial among professional historians. The
books' favorable treatment of reform legislation, Anyon argued, could be
explained only by an ideological bias: the books were meant to reinforce
contemporary institutions by linking them to policies and people highly
praised in the books. Anyon contended that the books substantially af-
fected students' political beliefs.88
Anyon did not attend to the linguistic techniques by which the texts
conveyed their approval of reform measures. His evidence revealed that
two techniques consistently reappear. First, concepts essential to both re-
formist and populist proposals were described in terms appropriate only
to the reform proposals. For example, many texts explained economics as
fueled by competition between self-interested individuals. Because some
populists argued that productivity arose from cooperation among individu-
als, their suggestions to reorient the economic system-elimination of for-
profit enterprises, for example-struck school children as ridiculous.
87
Another concept on which populists often disagreed with reformists was
the thesis that the working class was united against those who owned the
means of production. The texts emphasized that race and culture divided
workers against each other.88 Anyon contended that the texts ignored em-
ployers' efforts to create and exploit divisions among workers. The texts
thus discussed the working class solely in terms of the divisions between
workers acknowledged and fostered by capitalism.89 Consequently, stu-
84. Id. at 43-44.
85. Id. at 39-40, 49-51.
86. Id. at 49-53 & nn.1, 70-74; see also Freebody & Baker, Children's First Schoolbooks: Intro-
duction to the Culture of Literacy, 55 HARv. EDuc. REV. 381 (1985) (original study arguing that
reading primers reinforce gender and class stereotypes; review of literature on effects of textbooks on
childrens' worldviews). But see van Geel, supra note 2, at 262-87 (arguing that schools are ineffective
in inculcating values). Van Geel assumed that value inculcation attempted to achieve conformity. Its
failure to do so made his conclusion easy to reach. Political discourse analysts argued that orthodoxy
allows diversity. See supra notes 78-80.
87. Anyon, Workers, Labor and Economic History, and Textbook Content, supra note 81, at
49-50.
88. Id. at 45-47, 51.
89. Id.; see also D. MONTGOMERY, WORKERS' CONTROL IN AMERICA 153-54 (1979) (criticizing
history courses on same ground).
The constriction of possibilities appeared in other contexts as well. Raymond Williams noted that
"democracy" once called for self-expression and broad participation in a variety of community organi-
zations. In contemporary America, "democracy" referred only to voting and paying taxes. See R.
WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS 93-98 (rev. ed. 1983). The Supreme Court sharply limited avenues for popu-
lar participation in political decisions. See, e.g., Minnesota St. Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight,
465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) ("Disagreement with public policy and disapproval of officials' responsive-
ness . . . is to be registered principally at the polls."). An attempt to recapture the original meaning
of "democracy" is Note, Petitioning and the Empowerment Theory of Practice, 96 YALE L.J. 569
(1987) (First Amendment right of petition should be interpreted expansively to increase power of
marginal groups in society).
The short spectrum of political possibilities appeared also in mass media reports of popular political
actions. In a study of nightly news broadcasts, Jensen found that labor protests were evaluated in
terms of their effect on upcoming elections. This interpretation precluded the possibility that these
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dents developed constricted senses of what alternatives fit American
history. 0
Second, the texts depicted radical economic programs as utopian specu-
lation. Although they discussed populist proposals, they omitted populists'
specific proposals to reform the economic system. In contrast, discussions
of reformist proposals specified how those programs were implemented,
including details of legislation and the personalities of the presidents, la-
bor leaders, captains of industry, and legislators who carried them out.
Radical alternatives appeared to be airy things, incapable of providing
concrete guidance for daily life.91
In other contexts, the linguistic devices used to undercut alternatives'
persuasiveness might be unproblematic. In public schools, however, these
texts transmit a community judgment without allowing students to ex-
amine that judgment. This practice dictates what the students should ac-
cept as commonsensical and practical. In doing so, it vitiates the schools'
ability to develop the skills for self-government. The prose of the texts
seem to "deny all possibility of reflection on change in the future. . . .In
its flatness and its uncritical conformism, [the prose of American history
textbooks] is a kind of American socialist realism."9
protests might represent direct action outside the electoral process. It thereby restricted the definitions
of both union activity and politics. See Jensen, News As Ideology: Economic Statistics and Political
Ritual in Television Network News, 37 J. COMMUNICATION 8 (1987).
90. See supra note 86 (analyzing effects of textbooks). Studies of public discourse confirmed the
effectiveness of the strategy of defining key terms with reference only to one policy alternative. Fowler
studied newspaper articles criticizing delays in surgical treatment in the United Kingdom. Although
advocating proposals to give people more control over their treatment, these articles linked nouns
referring to patients to mental states or to things patients do to themselves. Nouns referring to doctors
and policymakers were active, often taking nouns referring to patients as objects. Fowler, Power, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 79, at 79-80. Fowler concluded that the reports' "language unwittingly re-
produces the attitudes that block reform. This conventional middle-class discourse, quite ordinary in
its stylistic character, is impregnated with discriminatory assumptions." Id. at 81. The language pro-
vided no suggestion for how patients can be made more active. They thus made even minimal reforms
seem impractical. This pattern repeated itself, to the same end, in language that described women as
inanimate objects, men as agents, see Seidel, Political Discourse Analysis, in id. at 53-55; in public
discourse about the homeless, see Sykes, Discrimination in Discourse, in id. at 89; and in discussion of
social conflicts, see R. FowLER, R. HODGE, G. KRESS & T. TREW, supra note 80, at 117-56. See
generally DISCOURSE AND DISCRIMINATION (G. Smitherman-Donaldson & T. van Dijk eds. 1988).
91. Anyon, Workers, Labor and Economic History, and Textbook Content, supra note 81, at 51.
Michel Pecheux supported this conclusion. He distributed identical sections of a single political
platform to two groups with similar backgrounds. One group, told the passages were extracted from
the platform of a left-wing political party, described the platform as containing unformed intentions to
achieve vaguely-phrased goals; members of the other group, told that the identical passages came from
the platform of a right-wing group, paraphrased it as including relatively detailed commands to be
implemented by existing institutions. The only variable was the respondents' information about the
political orientation of the authors. The discrepancy in interpretations suggested that the norms for
interpreting left-wing thought were substantially different from those used in deciphering right-wing
proposals. The effect of this difference was to make the left-wing thought appear impractical.
Pecheux, Are the Masses an Inanimate Object?, in LINGUISTIC VARIATION: MODELS AND METIi-
ODS 251 (D. Sankoff ed. 1976); see also Gottlieb, supra note 66, at 505 n.36 (texts' description of
public protests as not influencing U.S. policy in Vietnam made protest and participation seem
ineffectual).
92. F. FITZGERALD, AMERICA REvIsED 162 (1979); accord Gordon, supra note 71, at 566 (advo-
cacy of capitalism in public schools imposes orthodoxy on students).
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III. IMPLEMENTING THE DISCOURSE ANALYTIC APPROACH
The discourse analytic research points the way toward a new way of
resolving the conflict between schools' inculcative function and the need to
equip students for self-government. Schools fail to prepare students to
criticize when they describe ideas disfavored by school officials using the
two techiniques outlined above, restricted definition and utopianism.
These tactics tilt the playing field against disfavored ideas and immunize
favored ideas from criticism. Schools therefore must not employ them.
Concentrating on these two techniques-restricted definition and utopi-
anism-accomplishes two things that other approaches do not. First, it
dissolves the dilemma posed by the twin demands of inculcation and prep-
aration for self-government. The approach suggested here allows schools
to advocate community values vigorously. It simply forbids them from do-
ing so unfairly. It therefore eliminates the need for value neutrality. This
reduces the likelihood that courts will feel compelled to cut back on stu-
dents' First Amendment protections in order to allow schools to argue for
community values. It thus provides both greater latitude for schools and
greater security for students' First Amendment protections."
Second, the approach advocated here responds to the reality of students'
access to information. Ideas reach students in today's society. The problem
is to insure that students know how to take those ideas seriously. Simply
giving them more information will not help accomplish this.
The approach properly develops the orthodoxy doctrine. The discourse
analytic research on which it relies uncovers a new prerequisite for self-
government. In keeping with the development of the orthodoxy doctrine,
the approach advocated here incorporates the prerequisite into that doc-
trine. It also picks up on the hint in Tinker that schools may not unduly
influence the evaluation of ideas once ideas are admitted to the school. It
thus fulfills the promise of Pico.
Courts can begin the process of implementing this approach. They
should announce that how ideas are taught will be reviewed under the
prescriptions against orthodoxy. This declaration will shift attention from
the content of curricula to the way ideas are discussed. The burden of
implementing this falls on communities. Challenges to decisions of school
authorities will force public discussion of school boards' progress in elimi-
nating orthodoxy. Vibrant public discourse about education will by its
very existence help implement American society's commitment to "unin-
93. It is of course true that teachers occupy a place of power that enhances the persuasiveness of
the ideas they endorse. The aim of training students for citizenship, however, does not require that
students disagree at the time they hear ideas. Instead, it hopes to insure that students will learn the
techniques by which ideas may be criticized. Hence, even if they never disagree with any given idea
advocated by a faculty member, they will come away from the school with the ability to criticize ideas,
and some of the resources for doing so. See supra notes 78 & 79 (describing students' access to ideas
and resistance theory).
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hibited, robust, and wide-open" 4 public debate, as groups with substan-
tive disagreements and clashing interests argue about how school authori-
ties can best eradicate orthodoxy.95
Educational scholars have proposed many ways the requirement can be
implemented. For example, "democracy" should be described as a way
that people can participate in the activities of their own government; any
particular institution, whether circle of workers or republican legislature,
would be evaluated in terms of its efficacy at promoting popular initia-
tives; if necessary, alternative routes to participation such as protest96 and
petitioning the legislature97 may be discussed.98 In history texts one might
include information about alternative ideas advanced in a particular his-
torical period.99 Alternatively, schools might provide exercises for students
to discuss how utopian ideas might be made practical.1 00
94. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
95. This proposal would not compel schools to teach beliefs widely-regarded as evil. First, those
beliefs would not pass the test announced here. Many, if not most, "evil" beliefs rely on one or both
techniques for impairing criticism. Racist beliefs, for example, define "humanity" restrictively by ref-
erence to the characteristics and beliefs of one culture.
It is possible that an "evil" belief might not violate the requirement against using the two tech-
niques outlined in the text. In that case, this proposal might be the best antidote to such beliefs. It
would expose them to criticism that they would not otherwise receive and would insure that students
hear that criticism. The political discourse analysts devote much of their work to excavating and
defusing racist, sexist, or other "evil" beliefs in public discussion. See the works discussed in notes
78-80.
Finally, the problem of evil beliefs is irrelevant to this proposal. Within the parameters laid down
by current law, communities can decide for themselves what beliefs will be discussed in public schools.
This proposal regulates only how the chosen topics will be discussed. The proposal does not require
that every idea be taught in public schools.
96. Gottlieb, supra note 66, at 572-73.
97. See Note, supra note 89.
98. Paolo Freire directed literacy projects in a number of countries newly freed from colonial rule.
He found that his students believed that colonial structures and values were immutable. He en-
couraged them to work through practical, daily problems. They saw that those institutions and values
had grown in response to particular historical challenges. They also saw how they could re-design
those institutions as they faced new challenges. See Freire, The Problem-Posing Concept of Education
as an Instrument for Liberation, in EDUCATION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 392-93 (E. Steiner, R.
Arnove & B. McClellan eds. 1980); see also O'Neil, Decolonization and the Ideal Speech Commu-
nity: Some Issues in the Theory and Practice of Communicative Competence, in CRITICAL THEORY
AND PUBLIC LIFE 57, 69-71 (J. Forrester ed. 1985) (step by step introduction to Freire's pedagogy);
Misgeld, Education and Cultural Invasion: Critical Social Theory, Education as Instruction, and
the "Pedagogy of the Oppressed," in id. at 77, 105 (explaining relevance of Freire's work to educa-
tional planning).
99. Anyon, Workers, Labor & Economic History, and Textbook Content, supra note 81, sug-
gested that texts include information about the people advocating radical ideas and the specific propos-
als they made. Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism, supra note 66, argued that texts must note that
political protests sometimes succeed.
100. Freire again provides a model. His "pedagogy of the oppressed" encouraged students to talk
about utopian or unbelievable ideas in terms of the practical effects those ideas, if implemented, would
have on their own lives. While tracing the impact these "utopian" ideas might have on them, students
speculated about how the ideas could be adopted. Consequently, they began to see these ideas as
practical rather than utopian. See Freire, supra note 98; see also Bundy, Social Visions and Educa-
tional Futures, in SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND SCHOOlS: THE AMERICAN APPROACH 363, 377-80
(1979); Gitlin, School Structure and Teacher's Work, in IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE IN SCHOOLING,
supra note 78, at 193, 210-11 (1983); Apple, Curricular Form and the Logic Technical Control, in




Broadening the interpretation of the ban on orthodoxy will nurture the
"individual freedom of mind" necessary for self-government. The develop-
ment of a critical public attitude can only be enhanced by the fact that it
will begin with the education of students for "active and effective partici-
pation in [a] pluralistic, often contentious society," 10 a society they will
learn to keep free of any orthodoxy.
101. Pico, 457 U.S. at 868 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
1988] 1825

